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“People who lack confidence in their governments are more likely to leave their countries in hope of
finding better opportunities elsewhere.”
Quote from the United States Southern Command Strategy
“Enduring Promise for the Americas”
May 8, 2019
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This paper was developed in response to a request from
Florida International University to analyze the drivers
of migration from Central America. United States
Southern Command’s strategy Enduring Promise for the
Americas finds that “[w]eak governance and corruption
are among the most important challenges [in the
region].”1 Moreover, “People who lack confidence in their
governments are more likely to leave their countries in
hopes of finding better opportunities elsewhere.”2
This work briefly reviews the complex web of factors
traditionally considered migration drivers. The
authors’ interviews with migrants and their own work
on anti-corruption efforts in Central America led
them to hypothesize that something is missing from
this traditional framework. Interviews with migrants
in transit suggested that beyond any individual or
combination of factors stood a profound lack of hope
that the situation in their home country would improve.3
The authors hypothesize that persistent government
failure driven in large part by corruption produces a
sense of hopelessness among Central Americans that
contributes to and propels their decision to migrate.
The authors conclude that addressing weak governance
and corruption helps create a national context in which
individuals can see a future in their own country.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper analyzes the drivers of migration hypothesizing
that persistent government failure driven in large part
by corruption produces a sense of hopelessness among
Central Americans that contributes to and propels
their decision to migrate. Traditionally, corruption and
its contribution to hopelessness have not been studied
as drivers of migration. The authors conclude that
addressing weak governance and corruption helps create
a national context in which individuals can see a future in
their own country.
Central Americans from the Northern Triangle
countries have a complex set of motivations for
migration. Traditionally studied push factors include
poverty, violence and natural disasters. Pull factors
include economic opportunity/upward mobility,
protection, and family reunification.

larger social, political, and economic factors. While it is
an individual that migrates, it is their experience within
their community and nation that informs their decision.
Contextual factors contributing to migration include
respect for human rights, governance and corruption.
The State Department’s human rights reports paint a
clear picture of the deplorable human rights situation
in each Northern Triangle country and highlights the
high level of impunity and, conversely, low expectations
for justice that the majority can expect from their
governments and justice systems.
According to surveys of both experts and individuals,
government corruption and/or the perception of
corruption is widespread and endemic across the
Northern Triangle. Weak governance can be the result of
poor planning, lack of resources, and limited workforce
capacity, but in many instances, it is also the result of
corruption. While more research is needed, the thrust of
the studies cited suggest that corruption can be both a
direct and indirect driver of migration.
The authors identify hopelessness as contributing to
migration from the Northern Triangle. Since little
research has been done in this area, proxies like Subjective
Wellbeing (SWB) are considered. Hope, optimism, and
SWB are concepts based not only on personal experience,
but on one’s interaction with and perceptions of broader
society. One’s experience with endemic corruption can
contribute to a sense hopelessness.
The authors argue that endemic corruption in Central
America, and the destruction of mechanisms to
control corruption, undermine peoples’ confidence in
government and contribute to a lack of hope that their
lives will improve.
While the work done to date is insufficient to establish
direct correlations. If the citizens of Central America
believe that good governance and anti-corruption
measures can be successful and see the results of such
efforts reflected in improved healthcare, education,
access to education, and justice, it could improve their
sense of hope for the future and improve feelings of
SWB thus lessening an underlying push factor from
Central America. More must be done to address
government corruption in the region and to learn about
the relationship of hopelessness to migration.

The weight given to each factor is as varied as the
number of people migrating. The intention to migrate
is often based on one’s calculation of personal challenges
and opportunities. Decisions are also influenced by
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TABLE 1: INTENTION TO MIGRATE LAPOP

TABLE 2: HAVE YOU AND YOUR FAMILY SERIOUSLY
CONSIDERED LIVING IN ANOTHER COUNTRY?

El Salvador

Honduras

Guatemala

26%

38%

25%

Those who intend to
migrate
Of that number, those
thought it was very
or somewhat likely to
happen

68%

80%

67%

El Salvador

Honduras

Guatemala

37%

16%

37%

Source: Latinobarómetro12

Source: LAPOP country studies4

INTENTION TO MIGRATE
Determining what factors contribute to an individual’s
decision to migrate has been a long-standing task for
researchers and policymakers. Understanding who is
likely to migrate and why suggests how policies can be
structured to provide alternatives to migration. It is
assumed that in most cases individuals would prefer to
stay in their home countries and communities if their
basic needs are met and they see a future there.
There are two principal surveys of Latin America that
include questions relevant to determining intent to
migrate: the Latinobarómetro, and the Latin American
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) based at Vanderbilt
University. These surveys allow insight into what drives
people to migrate. LAPOP’s most recent surveys found
the following: See table 1
LAPOP’s most recent study on El Salvador covers 20185
and found that the “intention to migrate” decreased
from 36% of those interviewed in 2016 to 26% in 2018.
Within the 26% intending to migrate, 68% thought
that they were very or somewhat likely to do so.
LAPOP found that “Age, followed by the perception
on insecurity, and food insecurity are the factors that
most explain the intention to migrate.” Insecurity and
crime victimization had the greatest correlation with
the intention to migrate.6
In Honduras, LAPOP has preliminary results from
its study covering 2019.7 It found that 44% of those
surveyed had recently experienced food insecurity.
Twenty percent had been victims of crime in the
previous year. Almost 60% of those intending to
migrate thought that their economic situation was
worse than the year before. Thirty-eight percent
intended to migrate in the next three years and 50% of
that number thought that migration was very likely to
happen. Of those looking to leave, almost 80% thought
their migration was somewhat to very likely.
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The LAPOP review of Guatemala8 data from 2019
showed that 20% of those surveyed had been victims
of crime in the previous year. While Guatemalans are
often considered economic migrants, they rated crime
as the country’s most serious problem. Twenty-five
percent of those interviewed intended to migrate. And,
of that group, 39.2% thought it is very likely and 67%
thought that it is somewhat to very likely to happen.9
Interestingly, some scholars have found that being a
victim of violence in the last 12 months is not the major
driver in Guatemala. This, however, is not the case for
Honduras. Scholars ran regressions utilizing the LAPOP
2014 data to determine the drivers of migration.10 This
same study also found that “individuals in El Salvador
and Honduras who have experienced crime firsthand
multiple times are particularly likely to express
intentions to migrate.”11
Latinobarómetro takes a slightly different approach,
asking those surveyed in 2018: See table 2
High levels of migration from the Northern Triangle
to the United States has been underway for decades.
A review of the survey data since 2002 shows those
seriously considering migrating from El Salvador to be
consistently between 25% and the low 30s. Between 2016
and the most recent year for data 2018, the percentages
were between 32-37%.13
The percentage of those considering leaving Guatemala
was somewhat lower. A review of the data since 2002
shows the top year for intent to migrate was 2005 with
22%. In other years, percentages were consistently in
the teens.14
Honduras recorded percentages similar to those in El
Salvador for those considering migration. In the last
three years percentages have ranged between 37 and 40.15
A third approach to understanding decisions to migrate
is contained in a study titled, Saliendo Adelante: Why
Migrants Risk it All.16 This study conducted 2,400 in-
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TABLE 3: INTENTION TO MIGRATE 2019
El
Salvador

Honduras

Guatemala

Percentage of surveyed
who intend to migrate

24%

33%

18%

Percentage pf those who
intend to migrate who
cite victimization as a
primary motivation

38%

18%

14%

Percentage of those who
intend to migrate who
cite economics as primary
motivation

50%

67%

71%

Source: Creative Associates International17

person surveys in 60 of the highest migrant-sending
communities in the Northern Triangle and found
that in addition to general economic concerns such
as unemployment, a pessimistic economic outlook
influenced those considering migration. See table 3

TRADITIONAL DRIVERS OF
MIGRATION
Migration from the Central America region is
generally classified as “mixed migration.” This means
that migration has a variety of motivations and that
individuals included in a singular migrant flow may
fall under different legal protections (i.e., some may be
considered refugees while others may not).19
Furthermore, drivers of migration are generally divided
into two broad categories: push factors and pull factors.
Common push factors include lack of employment,
lack of economic opportunity, violence and threats
of violence, and personal insecurity. Common pull
factors include prospects for improved employment
opportunities abroad, desire for family reunification,
and greater security.
The 2020 World Migration Report found that, “Violence
and insecurity, poverty and family reunification remain
important drivers of migration from Central America.”20

PUSH FACTORS
Poverty
High poverty rates in Central America have long been a
leading push factor in the region. According to the World
Bank’s data set, poverty in the Northern Triangle is as
follows (using the most recent year available): El Salvador

22.8% (2019); Honduras 48.3% (2018); Guatemala 59.3%
(2014).21 High poverty rates in these countries is endemic.
A more detailed analysis of Central American poverty
indicators is provided below, which was compiled by the
Seattle International Foundation. See table 4
Additionally, the Saliendo Adelante report found that
economic factors where the principal reasons given for
decisions to migrate by those surveyed.23 Among the
top economic reasons were unemployment, household
earnings, and a pessimistic economic outlook. The
report concluded that, “Believing that their household’s
economic situation is on the decline is an interestingly
strong indicator of migration. This is particularly true
in high migration municipalities in Honduras, where
believing that the household is worse off than it was
the previous year makes individuals 1.5 times more
likely to consider migrating.”24
Violence
El Salvador and Honduras have consistently reported
some of the highest homicide rates in the world for
countries not at war. While the number of murders in
each country has been decreasing of late, they remain
significantly above the regional average, and Honduras
witnessed an uptick in 2019. With murder rates expressed
per 100,000 inhabitants, El Salvador was at a worldwide
high of 105 in 2015, decreasing to 52 in 2018, and 36 in
2019. Honduras was the global leader in 2011 at 83.8 per
100,000 inhabitants, dropped to 38.9 in 2018, then ticked
up again in 2019 to over 40 per 100,000.25 Guatemala has
a comparably lower homicide rate problem, with a high
of 45 in 2009 declining to 22.5 in 2018.26 See table 5
Yet violence and victimization in this region go
well beyond homicides. Violence against women
and domestic violence are widespread and often are
unreported or unpunished. In fact, the Northern
Triangle Countries have some of highest incidence of
femicides in the region. According to statistics gathered
by a private marketing firm (Statista) El Salvador and
Honduras had the highest femicide rates of 6.8/100,000
and 5.1/100,000 respectively with Guatemala coming in
fifth with a rate of 2.28 According to UN Women, 1 in 5
(21.2%) of Guatemalan women between the ages of 15
and 49 and in a relationship have experienced physical
and/or sexual intimate partner violence. In Honduras,
the rate is 27.8% and in El Salvador 14.3%.
The impact of gangs and organized crime are also
profound. According to two separate estimates made by
SOUTHCOM and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime
there are roughly 60 to 70,000 youth gang members in the
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TABLE 4: POVERTY IN CENTRAL AMERICA
Multidimensional
Multidimensional
Poverty Index
Year and
Survey

Contribution of Deprivation
in Dimension to Overall
Multidimensional Poverty

Population in Multidimensional Poverty

Index

Headcount

Intensity
of
Deprivation

Number
of Poor
(Year of
the Survey)

Number
of Poor
(2017)

Population
Vulnerable to
Multidimensional
Poverty

Health

Education

Standard
of Living

(%)

National
Poverty
Line

PPP $1.90
a Day

2007-2018

Value

(%)

(%)

Value

(%)

(%)

El Salvador

2014

0.032

7.9

41.3

494

501

0.009

1.7

9.9

15.5

43.1

41.1

29.2

1.9

Guatemala

2014/2015

0.134

28.9

46.2

4,694

4,885

0.013

11.2

21.1

26.3

35.0

38.7

59.3

8.7

Honduras

2011/2012

0.090

19.3

46.4

1,642

1,788

0.013

6.5

22.3

18.5

33.0

48.5

61.9

17.2

Nicaragua

2011/2012

0.074

16.3

45.2

956

1,011

0.013

5.5

13.2

11.1

36.5

52.4

24.9

3.2

Country

(Thousands) (Thousands)

Population
Inequality
In Severe
Among the
Multidimensional
Poor
Poverty

Population Living Below
Income Poverty Line (%)

2007-2018 2007-2017

Source: World Bank22

Northern Triangle. These estimates are between 8 and 10
years old but a general sense of the extent of the problem.
These gang members are subdivided into countless
“cliques” or local groups rooted in communities and
neighborhoods. Some claim membership in larger gang
networks – such MS-13 or Calle 18, but many other groups
develop their own identity and operate solely in their
neighborhood or a particular part of a neighborhood.30
Regardless of the numbers, the gangs exercise enormous
control at the local level. From recruitment of
children as young as eight or nine, to extorsion of all
economic activity in a community, the gang presence
in a community can be pervasive. Furthermore, there
are communities and areas where government does
not provide security or effective public services, and
criminal groups become a substitute for the state
essentially exercising territorial control. In MS-13: The
Making of America’s most Notorious Gang, Steven Dudley
describes the gang as, “a threat that trades on its
reputation for brutal murders, which has helped make
Central America one of the most violent regions in
the world and has devastated many US communities…
But the MS-13 is also greatly misunderstood….it is a
hand-to-mouth organization whose criminal economy
is based mostly on small-time extortion schemes and
petty drug dealing, not international drug trafficking or
sophisticated corruption.”31
Saliendo Adelante also found that crime victimization was
cited as a primary motivation for migration among 38%
of those surveyed in El Salvador, 14% in Guatemala, and
18% in Honduras. Those citing victimization as a primary
factor included “personal exposure to homicides,” robbery,
and extortion as primary factors. Of the high migrationsending communities, the study found that, “having been
a victim of a crime or having a family member or someone
close to you who has been makes an individual 1.5 times
more likely to consider migrating.”32
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Natural Disasters
According to The UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Latin America is the
second most disaster-prone region in the world.33 The
Northern Triangle is subject to earthquakes, volcanic
activity, hurricanes, and flooding.
The most recent natural disasters to hit the Northern
Triangle were hurricanes Eta and Iota in early
November 2020. Both category 4 storms at landfall,
produced extensive rainfall, wind damage, flooding, and
landslides. The storms impacted 7.3 million in Central
America, according to OCHA.34 At least, 183,000 homes
were lost or damaged in Honduras, Guatemala, and
Nicaragua. The effect of these storms will likely impact
outmigration in the coming months, especially in
Honduras where flooding was widespread. In response
to the storms’ impact the U.S. extended Temporary
Protected Status (TPS) to Hondurans in the United
States until October 2021.36
In contrast, drought is the type of ongoing natural
disaster that has impacted the most people in Latin
America and the Caribbean in recent years. In Central
America, the area impacted by drought is known as
the “dry corridor” which passed through the Northern
Triangle and Nicaragua. OCHA found that the
following number of people were impacted by drought
in this region between 2000-2019. See table 6
Additionally, increased weather volatility is one aspect
of climate change with a direct impact on migration.
The World Migration Report found that “climate change
may have played a role in recent migration dynamics in
Central America, with a significant number of people
who were part of the caravan, for example, engaged in
activities such as agriculture, forestry, cattle raising and
fishing prior to embarking on the journey northward.”38
Climate turbulence does not bode well for Central
America, where extreme storms and drought likely
already contribute to outmigration.

Hopelessness and Corruption: Overlooked Drivers of Migration from the Northern Triangle of Central America

TABLE 5: HOMICIDE RATE – NORTHERN TRIANGLE
AND MEXICO27

TABLE 6: PEOPLE IMPACTED BY DROUGHT BETWEEN
2000-2019 (IN MILLIONS)

120

100

80

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Total Population

7.1

16.9

9.8

Impacted by drought

1.4

55.7

1.5

Source: UNOCHA37
60

40

20

0
2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Honduras

Guatemala

México

El Salvador

2019

Source: World Bank and Insight Crime27

Furthermore, it is widely believed that those practices
contributing to climate change (e.g., deforestation and
poor land use regulation) exacerbate the impact of
natural disasters, further aggravating the environmental,
economic, and human impacts that drive migration. For
example, a post-hurricane Mitch assessment found that,
“[w]hat turned Mitch from a natural hazard to a human
disaster was a chain reaction of social vulnerabilities
created by long-term climate change, environmental
degradation, poverty, social inequality, population
pressure, rapid urbanisation and international debt.”39

PULL FACTORS
Economic Opportunity/Upward Mobility
While poverty in the Northern Triangle is a principal
push factor from the region, the corresponding pull
factor in the United States is economic opportunity.
The federal minimum wage in the U.S. in 2020 is $7.25
an hour, with many states now paying $15. The average
wage for construction work, long a staple of immigrant
employment, is nearly $15 an hour, even in many states
without a $15 minimum wage.40
The minimum wage, for those with steady employment
in Honduras is approximately $1 to $1.50 an hour.41 While
varying somewhat, El Salvador and Guatemala are in a
similar range. Furthermore, according to the International
Labor Organization (ILOSTAT) the share of informal

employment in Guatemala and Honduras is just over
80%, dropping to 68% in El Salvador.42 Women are more
heavily represented in the informal sector than are men
so disruptions in the informal sector fall heaviest on
women and children who are generally more dependent
on a women’s income than men’s. In each case, however,
informal sector workers are exceptionally vulnerable to
natural and human disasters such as the pandemic and
recent hurricanes. Furthermore, an inadequate social
safety net, caused in part by systemic corruption, greatly
exacerbates the impact of economic downturns.
In this context of economic and social vulnerability,
remittances are a huge part of the Northern Triangle
economies and provide a lifeline for many Central
Americans. In 2018, 21.4% of El Salvador’s GDP came from
remittances, 20% of Honduras, and 12% in Guatemala.43
Most of these remittances come from family in the
United States. The steady flow of remittances is felt by
those on the receiving end and seen by everyone in their
communities. As those who receive remittances expand
and/or improve their houses, or buy appliances, there
is a constant reminder in the broader community that
economic opportunity lay to the north.
Protection
Thousands of Central Americans flee to the U.S. seeking
protection from violence and persecution in their home
countries. Not all meet the criteria for asylum, but it
is clear that many view the United States as place
where they can be safe, thrive, and potentially reunited
with family. As General John Kelly once said while
Commander of U.S. Southern Command, “ “In many
ways [parents] are trying to save their children” from
the violence in their own countries.44 Even though the
Trump Administration has made it almost impossible
for Central Americans to cross the US/Mexico border
and apply for, no less win political asylum, the dream of
finding protection in the United States dies hard.
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Failing U.S. Immigration System
The Trump Administration and its congressional allies
have argued vociferously that a failing U.S. immigration
system and a porous U.S.-Mexico border have been a
principle pull factors in Central American migration.
Rather than addressing conditions in Central America
that are propelling migration, they have emphasized that
Central American migration is propelled by lax border
enforcement, loopholes in immigration laws, and a
chaotic and uncontrolled border. In a May 2019 written
statement issued by the White House, the President
says, “The United States is a great country that can no
longer be exploited due to its foolish and irresponsible
immigration laws. For the sake of our people, and for
the sake of our future, these horrendous laws must be
changed now.”45 And in April 2018 the White House
released a written statement stating, “Catch and release
has allowed an influx of illegal aliens to enter and
remain in the United States and only encourages more
and more illegal immigration.”46

were leaving. The majority responded, “there is nothing
in this country, I lost family to Covid-19, there isn’t work,
(and) the illegitimate government has overwhelmed us
[literally - el usurpador nos tiene agobiados].”49

While the authors recognize that the U.S. immigration
system is very inefficient and in need of significant
reform, we do believe these failings are a major cause,
or pull factor for Central American irregular migration.

BROADER CONTEXTUAL
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO
MIGRATION

Family Reunification
Migration from the Northern Triangle to the United
States has been so significant in recent years that
20% of households throughout the region receive
remittances from family members.47 Remittances most
often come from first generation migrants. Two-thirds
of the respondents in the survey by Creative Associates
International, which focused on sending communities
in the three countries, had family in the United States.
However, only three percent of respondents cited family
reunification as their primary reason for migrating.
Many things encourage people to consider leaving their
homeland. Latinobarómetro concluded that “People
who have been victimized previously, who believe the
national economy is in poor shape, who have relatives
living abroad, and who have weak ties to home are
- much more likely to express a preference for going
abroad. In conclusion, positive life experiences and
perceptions matter. The simple truth is that, generally
speaking, those who are not happy are more inclined to
express a desire to “vote with their feet.’”48
Academic surveys provide important data points, but
they do not reflect the sense of cumulative despair that
can be at play. The Social Action Commission of the
Mennonite Church in Honduras interviewed migrant
caravan participants in the fall of 2020 asking why they
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In summary, there are a variety of push and full
factors driving migration. The weight given to each
factor is as varied as the number of people migrating.
Intentions to migrate is often based on an individual’s
calculation of the various challenges and opportunities
someone experiences and can reflect very individual
decisions influenced by larger social, political, and
economic factors. While individuals migrate, it is
their experience within their own community and
nation that informs their decision making. This study
points to other factors for consideration as drivers
of migration - hopelessness which can be fed by the
individuals’ experience with government failure due to
endemic government corruption.

Beyond the traditional push and pull factors impacting
individual decisions to migrate, there are several broader
issues that can be missed or are obscured by traditional
surveys of migrants, or those likely to migrate. These
factors are the broader backdrop to individual
considerations of migration and include such factors as
political instability, general human rights conditions,
trust in democratic institutions, and corruption.
Human Rights Context
Human rights violations, lack of public security, and
inadequate justice systems are both direct and indirect
contributors to migration, as many of those coming to
the US apply for political asylum. Between 2017 and
2019 the Northern Triangle countries were among the
top five nations to apply affirmatively and defensively
for political asylum.50 The following excerpts are taken
from the Department of State’s “2019 Country Report
on Human Rights,” documents frequently used in the
defense of asylum claims by migrants in the U.S.
EL SALVADOR
Significant human rights issues included: allegations
of unlawful killings of suspected gang members and
others by security forces; forced disappearances
by military personnel; torture by security forces;
arbitrary arrest and detention by the PNC; harsh and
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life-threatening prison conditions; serious problems
with the independence of the judiciary; widespread
government corruption; violence against women and
girls that was inconsistently addressed by authorities;
security force violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) individuals; and
children engaged in the worst forms of child labor.
Impunity persisted despite government steps to dismiss
and prosecute abusers in the security forces, executive
branch, and justice system.
Organized criminal elements, including local and
transnational gangs and narcotics traffickers, were
significant perpetrators of violent crimes and
committed acts of murder, extortion, kidnapping,
human trafficking, intimidation, and other threats and
violence directed against police, judicial authorities, the
business community, journalists, women, and members
of vulnerable populations. In some cases, authorities
investigated and prosecuted persons accused of
committing crimes and human rights abuses.52
HONDURAS
Significant human rights issues included: unlawful or
arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings; torture;
harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary
arrest or detention; killings of and threats to media
members by criminal elements; criminalization of libel,
although no cases were reported; widespread government
corruption; and threats and violence against indigenous,
Afro-descendent communities, and lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons.
The government continued to prosecute and punish
officials who committed abuses, but a weak judicial
system and corruption were major obstacles to gaining
convictions.
Organized criminal elements, including local and
transnational gangs and narcotics traffickers, were
significant perpetrators of violent crimes and
committed acts of homicide, torture, kidnapping,
extortion, human trafficking, intimidation, and other
threats and violence directed against human rights
defenders, judicial authorities, lawyers, the business
community, journalists, bloggers, women, and members
of vulnerable populations. The government investigated
and prosecuted many of these crimes, particularly
through the HNP’s Violent Crimes Task Force.53

GUATEMALA
Significant human rights issues included: harsh and lifethreatening prison conditions; substantial problems
with the independence of the judiciary, including
malicious litigation and irregularities in the judicial
selection process; widespread corruption; trafficking
in persons; crimes involving violence or threats thereof
targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
intersex (LGBTI) persons, persons with disabilities, and
members of other minority groups; and use of forced or
compulsory or child labor.
Corruption and inadequate investigations made
prosecution difficult. The government was criticized
by civil society for refusing to renew the International
Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala’s (CICIG)
mandate, which expired on September 3. Impunity
continued to be widespread for ongoing human rights
abuses, endemic government corruption, and for mass
atrocities committed during the 1960-1996 internal
armed conflict.54
The excerpts above paint a clear picture of the deplorable
human rights situation in each country of the Northern
Triangle and highlight the high levels of impunity and,
conversely, low expectations for justice the majority
poor and powerless can expect from their governments
and justice systems.

GOVERNANCE AND
CORRUPTION
Weak and ineffective governance suggests that
democratic institutions are not functioning as they
should, and basic public needs are not being met. Weak
governance means that countries like Honduras were
grossly unprepared to evacuate, shelter, and meet the
humanitarian needs of its people when two category four
hurricanes struck the country within a few days of each
other in November 2020 causing massive flooding, wind
damage, and landslides and displacing an estimated 4.3
million Hondurans.
Weak governance can be the result of poor planning,
lack of resources, and limited workforce capacity.
There is also significant research that highlights the
links between ineffective governance and a country’s
economic and political elite. Poor governance is not
simply the lack of resources or a capable workforce
but the byproduct of corruption at a grand or systemic
scale that goes beyond the actions of one “rotten apple”
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and involves intentional state capture by economic
and political elite, using the state for their narrow
self-interest. These relationships were extensively
documented by Insight Crime in a 2016 series of studies
entitled, “Elites and Organized Crime.”55
Evidence of elite corruption are easily identifiable
now as well. This is the case in Honduras where
prosecutions underway in the United States have linked
Honduras President Juan Orlando Hernandez to alleged
conspiracies to traffic illicit drugs into the United
States.56 Additionally, audits performed by two separate
Honduran civil society organizations uncovered
significant corruption in the government’s response
to COVID. For example, the National Anticorruption
Council (CNA) issued 14 reports during 2020 under the
banner “Corruption in Times of Covid-19,”outlining
both price-gauging and misuse or loss of government
resources during the pandemic.57 Among other things,
CNA documented how the Honduran government
paid for seven mobile hospitals that were overpriced,
received late, and two have never been delivered.58
CNA´s reporting, along with other reports by the
Asociación para una Sociedad Mas Justa (ASJ) in the
departure of the directors of COPECO, the country’s
emergency preparedness agency, and INVEST-H, a
semi-autonomous government contracting agency . As a
result of the upheaval within COPECO the government
moved to name as the new head of the agency a celebrity
known for his reggaeton music and identified by his stage
name Killa. He admitted from the start that he was
unfamiliar with emergency preparedness and response,
and COPECO was roundly criticized for mishandling
their early response to the hurricanes.
Whether or not an individual is personally impacted
by weak governance and corruption, the existence of
widespread corruption creates a general lack of confidence
in government and depresses expectations for the future.
Corruption and perceptions of corruption are
manifest and measured in multiple ways. Transparency
International (TI) defines corruption as, “the abuse of
entrusted power for private gain.”59 For this paper we
focus on corruption as employed by public officials, or
state corruption. The Northern Triangle countries have
a serious and sustained corruption problem based both
on perception and victimization data.
TI ranks the nations of the world based on “how corrupt
a country’s public sector is perceived to be by experts and
business executives.”60 Rankings for the most recent year
are from 2018. On a scale of 1-100, 100 being no corruption,
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Guatemala receives a score of 27; Honduras 29, and El
Salvador 35. In recent years each of these countries have
consistently scored near or below the bottom third of
countries in the corruption perception index.
Additional well-respected efforts to measure corruption
by country are found in the work of the World Justice
Project with their Rule of Law Index, and their measure of
the “Absence of Corruption.” The World Bank has also
developed a series of measures it includes in its World
Governance Indicators for “Rule of Law,” and “Control
of Corruption.” Table 7 summarizes some of their findings
for Central America and links to their studies.
The LAPOP survey takes a different approach to
corruption measurement, asking the individuals surveyed
about their experience with victimization and how they
perceive a variety of institutions in relation to corruption.
See table 8
Latinobarómetro asks how much trust people have in
their government. Their survey from 2018 found an
almost total lack of faith in government. See table 9
Examining the Latinobarómetro survey for these
countries since 2002, one finds that people’s overall rating
of the trustworthiness of their national government was
almost never above 50%. In other words, the problem
of government corruption and/or its perception is
widespread and endemic across the Northern Triangle.

CORRUPTION AND
MIGRATION
If experiences of abuse and perceptions of corruption
cast doubt on the legitimacy of government, what are
the connections between corruption and intentions to
migrate? While this question has not been extensively
researched, especially in the Northern Triangle, there
are several studies conducted in other parts of the world
that begin to suggest a link.
A 2013 study published by the Center for International
Economics, entitled, The Effect of Corruption on Migration,
1985-2000, compiled data relevant to 111 countries. It
found, “Robust evidence indicates that corruption is
among the push factors of migration, especially fueling
skilled migration.”64
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TABLE 7: PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA
Transparency
International
Corruption
Perceptions Index

World Justice
Project
Rule of
Law Index

World Justice
Project Rule of Law
Index - Absence
of Corruption

Worldwide
Governance
Indicators - Rule
of Law

Worldwide
Governance
Indicators - Control
of Corruption

Score (Rank)

Score (Rank)

Score (Rank)

Percentile Rank

Percentile Rank

Honduras

26/100
(146/198)

0.40
(116/128)

0.32
(114/128)

15.38

23.08

Guatemala

26/100
(146/198)

0.45
(101/128)

0.34
(108/128)

13.94

18.75

Nicaragua

22/100
(161/198)

0.39
(118/128)

0.34
(105/128)

9.62

12.5

El Salvador

34/100
(113/198)

0.49
(84/128)

0.38
(98/128)

23.56

32.69

Transparency
International

World Justice Project

World Justice Project

World Bank

World Bank

Country

Source

Source: National Disasters and Reconstruction, Seattle International Foundation61

A 2017 study published by Deutsche Gesellschaft fur
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)65, attempts to
establish a theoretical framework to explain the link
between corruption and migration. The study is based
on two case studies, both in Africa, although the findings
are presumed to be more generally relevant. They found
that the indirect influence of corruption on migration
was much stronger than the direct links. Indirectly,
corruption had an impact many aspects of human security
(e.g., health, food, environmental, economic, etc.) and
therefore can underlie many reasons for migration.
In 2015, a study published by the Migration Policy
Institute, found:
The desire to move abroad is often driven by a
lack of faith in local opportunities. If corruption
and nepotism are perceived to undermine
meritocracy, it is a plausible reaction to turn
towards opportunities elsewhere, especially among
the highly skilled. This direct effect on individual
migration decisions comes in addition to the
negative indirect impacts of corruption on the
economy or on security. Widespread corruption
can hamper economic development and undermine
the rule of law. The resulting poverty and insecurity
can in turn stimulate the wish to leave.
More specific to Central America, the Center for
American Progress published a paper in 2019 that found:

programs, undertake much-needed law and justice
reforms, and help communities battered by climate
change manage erratic weather patterns and crop
failure. This pervasive impunity and indifference
has sown hopelessness in societies already struggling
with staggering violence and high unemployment.
The resulting desperation and pessimism have
contributed to high migration levels even in
countries where levels of violence have improved in
recent years—for example, Honduras, where migrant
flows have increased even though homicides have
dropped significantly since 2016.67
While more research must be conducted in Central
America to draw strong conclusions, the thrust of
the studies cited suggest that corruption can be both
a direct and indirect driver of migration. Given the
elevated perceptions of corruption in the Northern
Triangle, serious investigations into networks of
corruption embedded in many government institutions
including legislatures in Guatemala and Honduras,
and even among Heads of State in all three countries,
it is not surprising that public trust in government is
low. As a Honduran mother told one of the authors in
a migrant shelter in Southern Mexico, “I have no faith
that the government will resolve any of our problems.
Every day we hear of corruption at the highest levels in
our government. The politicians are not going to make
things better. They just want to steal from us.”68

A combination of democratic backsliding,
deepening corruption and state capture, and
weak institutions has meant that national and
regional elites in Central America and Mexico are
uninterested in and unwilling to invest in social
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TABLE 8: VICTIMIZATION AND PERCEPTION
OF CORRUPTION

TABLE 9: HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE DO YOU HAVE
(IN THE GOVERNMENT)?

El Salvador

Honduras

Guatemala

Have been victims of
corruption in the last
12 months

12%

25%

19%

Believe that all
politicians are corrupt

32%

42%

N/A

Believe that corruption of
government functionaries
is very generalized

48%

40%

61%

Little to none

El Salvador

Honduras

Guatemala

80%

78%

79%

Source: Latinobarómetro63

Source: LAPOP62

HOPELESSNESS, SUBJECTIVE
WELLBEING, AND MIGRATION

suggest that happiness or hopefulness is likely based on
factors beyond individual personal experience.

In recent years scholarly research attempting to measure
happiness and Subjective Well-Being have expanded
along with our understanding of how these difficult
to measure concepts impact decision making and the
effectiveness of public policy.

Graham and Julia Ruiz Pozuelos conducted a survey
looking at hope in young adults in Peru.73 They found
that youth had a high level of optimism even though
they had experienced negative shock, like being a victim
of theft, a parent leaving the home or family illness. The
young adults’ optimism seemed based on more than their
personal experience with difficulty but with broader
societal factors or interaction, in this case positive factors.

Hopelessness is the term that the authors have chosen to
describe the sentiment they found reflected in personal
individual interviews with migrants. Merriam-Webster
defines hopelessness as, “having no expectation of good
or success.”69 Furthermore, that hopelessness, “suggests
despair and the cessation of effort or resistance, and
often implies acceptance or resignation.”
Since feelings of hopelessness have not been the focus of
migration surveys, the authors have tried to find proxies
for this concept in academic work. A few studies have
assessed happiness and despair in relation to migration,
but this research field is new. Much of the work already
done measures happiness post-migration, attempting to
learn if migration increases happiness.70
Research by Carol Graham and Julie Markowitz,
entitled the Aspirations and Happiness of Potential Latin
American Immigrants, was an early attempt [2011] to
look at the issue of happiness and migration in Latin
America. It is based on the Latinobarómetro survey
questions about “intent to migrate” as a surrogate for
actual migration. The study finds that, “The profile of
Latin American emigrants provided suggests they are
unhappy with their current situation prior to migrating,
above and beyond considerations of wealth level, fears of
unemployment, and feelings of insecurity (such as being
a crime victim).”71 This is relevant because it supports
“the hypothesis that unhappiness drives migration”72 and
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Another concept relevant to the intersection of
migration, governance, and corruption is Subjective
Well-Being (SWB), generally considered a measure of
happiness. SWB tries to assess how people feel about
their lives. It is based on self-reported happiness
or life satisfaction. This field has taken on policy
relevance “among researchers, politicians, national
statistical offices, the media, and the public. The value
of this information lies in its potential contribution to
monitoring the economic, social, and health conditions
of populations and in potentially informing policy
decisions across these domains.”74 It is one way to analyze
and measure the intersection between individual and
society level experience.
A 2014 study on international migration and SWB that
was not Latin America specific found that “individuals
with higher SWB have lower international migration
desires. At the individual level, the SWB-migration
relationship appears to be more robust than the incomemigration relationship.”75 This would be an interesting
area for further investigation in the Americas.
Factors that are traditionally considered drivers of
migration, personal experience with crime, violence
and lack of work, are only part of the complex interplay
of factors that lead to migration. Hope, optimism, and
SWB are concepts that are formed based not only on
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personal experience, but on one’s interaction with and
perceptions of broader society. While the work done
to date is insufficient to establish direct correlations,
it does show possible links between corruption and
migration. It strongly suggests that more can be
learned about these dynamics.

CONCLUSION
There are many factors that contribute to migration
from the Northern Triangle to the United States. While
this paper reviews the established pull and push factors
effecting Central American migration, the authors have
hypothesized that the profound sense of hopelessness
they found when interviewing migrants likely reflected
their sense of diminished Subjective Well-Being,
influenced by personal experience and their interaction
with the broader society.
Generalized human rights abuses and impunity along
with weak and ineffective governance contribute to
feelings of pessimism about the future. Additionally,
serious problems of systemic corruption, including
at the highest levels of government, is an especially
important factor influencing trust in government,
regime legitimacy, and depressing feelings of SWB.
The authors argue that endemic corruption in Central
America, and the destruction of mechanisms to
control corruption, undermined peoples’ confidence in
government and contributed to a lack of hope that their
lives will improve.
These negative conclusions suggest several positive steps
that should be taken. If the citizens of Central America
believe that good governance and anti-corruption
measures can be successful and see the results of such
efforts reflected in improved healthcare, education,
access to education, and justice, it could improve their
sense of hope for the future and improve feelings of SWB
thus lessening an underlying push factor from Central
America. More must be done to address government
corruption in the region.
Furthermore, because SWB is an increasingly valuable
tool for understanding social problems and their
solutions, more should be done to understand the
relationship between SWB and the drivers of migration.
The good news is, as Dr. Carol Graham, leader of much
of the relevant research about happiness, has said, “You
can change people’s perceptions of hope.”76
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